

Presidential Cues and the Nationalization of Congressional Rhetoric, 1973-2016

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Abstract

Presidents occupy a unique role as both the head of the executive branch and a de-facto party leader. They nationalize politics and polarize lawmaking. Members of Congress know this, and they leverage the president's symbolic power to heighten political conflict. I argue that lawmakers, particularly those in the non-presidential party, invoke the president to nationalize legislative debate and polarize constituent opinion. Using the text of House and Senate floor speeches between 1973-2016 and a within-member panel design, I find that legislators reference the president more frequently in the out-party, and increasingly so as a district's media environment becomes more nationalized. Presidential references are also moderated by constituency partisanship. I support the behavioral implications with a vignette experiment: when a Republican Senator invokes President Biden in a policy speech, Republican respondents increase approval of that Senator and oppose political compromise. This research highlights the institutional consequences of nationalization and negative partisanship.

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On March 31, 2021, President Biden released details about what would become the Bipartisan Infrastructure Bill. Shortly thereafter, an Oklahoma-based firm fielded a survey about the proposal (McFerron 2021; Rakich 2021). The firm told half the sample the bill would expand Amtrak service in the state. They found that 71 percent were in favor. The firm told the other half of the sample about the same plan “unveiled by President Biden.” Support fell 14 points. On their own, these results illustrate how presidential cues can shape public opinion. However, these presidency-focused frames are not just the creation of survey firms—they are emblematic of the way lawmakers discuss policy on the floor of Congress. For example, Representative French Hill (R-AK) attacked the infrastructure plan, saying “Democrats have turned to a partisan, top-down, rampant spending style of governing with *President Biden’s infrastructure vision* as the latest example” (Congressional Record, April 21, 2021, H2034; emphasis added). Representative Scott Franklin (R-FL) argued the bill was “a socialist wish list. Less than 8 percent of *President Biden’s infrastructure plan* goes to roads, bridges, waterways, ports, and airports” (Congressional Record, April 22, 2021, H2091; emphasis added). As the head of the executive branch and a de-facto party leader (Jacobson 2019; Levinson and Pildes 2006; Lee 2009), the president is an engine of nationalization (Hopkins 2018; Schattschneider 1960) and legislative conflict (Cohen 2019; Lee 2009). However, these anecdotes suggest that lawmakers leverage the president’s symbolic role to heighten political conflict.

Members of Congress seek attention for themselves, their parties, and their priorities. Capturing that attention is challenging. Most Americans pay little attention to politics (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1997; Zaller 1992), with one important exception: the president, who is universally known and constantly covered (Edwards 2003). As politics have nationalized and polarized (Hopkins 2018; Pierson and Schickler 2020; Schattschneider 1960), the president has become a heuristic through which voters understand the two parties and their representatives’ behavior (e.g., Gronke, Koch and Wilson 2003; Jacobson 2019; Popkin 1991). When the president is successful, one party benefits at the expense

of the other (Lebo and O'Geen 2011), which "persuades members to rally around the initiatives of their own party's president, and, as a mirror image, the other party to resist initiatives championed by an opposing party's president" (Lee 2009, 3). Scholars of this interbranch dynamic focus on presidential leadership as the cause of this conflict: presidents advance their agendas, symmetrically polarizing legislative behavior (Beckmann 2010; Bond and Fleisher 1990; Cohen 2019; Lebo and O'Geen 2011; Lee 2009). Opposition lawmakers damage the president through investigations (Kriner and Schickler 2016) and veto brinkmanship (Groseclose and McCarty 2001), but these tactics rely on institutional power. At the same time, scholars of congressional communication focus on lawmakers' discussions of national versus local issues (Grimmer 2013*b*; Rogowski and Stone 2020) or their use of divisive and polarizing rhetoric, broadly defined (Ash, Morelli and Van Weelden 2017; Ballard et al. 2021; Gentzkow, Shapiro and Taddy 2019; Lee 2016; Russell 2018, 2020; Wang and Tucker 2020, but see Fu and Howell 2020; Green 2015; Groeling 2010). Even as congressional communications become increasingly important (Lee 2016), we know less about why lawmakers talk about the president and who is most likely to do so. Answering these questions helps us understand how nationalization and negative partisanship manifest within Congress as well as the consequences for interbranch policy-making.

I argue members of Congress explicitly reference the president to nationalize policy debate, polarizing constituent opinion to advance their electoral and policy goals. By nationalizing debate, lawmakers attract attention to the issues they care about and expand the scope of conflict (Schattschneider 1960). The president is a potent, partisan symbol (Jacobson 2019) and source cue (Mondak 1993) who "focuses the eyes and draws out the attachments of people" (Skowronek 1998, 20). In particular, the presidency is "the principal instrument for the nationalization of politics" (Schattschneider 1960, 14) and references to presidents (and presidential candidates) "cue a set of meaningful associations with the national parties, the social groups that support them, and the positions they take" (Hop-

kins 2018, 2). By associating the president with policy, lawmakers heighten conflict and attract inattentive constituents who hold strong, polarized opinions about the president (Donovan et al. 2019; Jones 2020). However, in an era defined by negative partisanship, attention facilitates opposition. Americans are motivated and mobilized by out-group animus (Abramowitz and Webster 2016, 2018; Iyengar and Krupenkin 2018). References to party leaders asymmetrically polarize opinion among the other party's partisans (Nicholson 2012). Taken together, theories of nationalization and negative partisanship imply that out-partisans, but not in-partisans, can benefit by invoking the president in debate. I hypothesize that lawmakers increasingly invoke the president when in the out-party, but this effect is moderated by constituency support for the president. Behaviorally, I expect out-party presidential references to cue partisan considerations among out-party voters (see Rogowski and Stone 2020) who will increase support for the lawmaker while decreasing support for compromise.

I test these hypotheses in two parts. First, I turn to a corpus of nearly two million floor speeches given by over 2,200 members of the House and Senate from 1973–2016 (Gentzkow, Shapiro and Taddy 2018). I measure how often lawmakers directly reference the president in two-year congresses, and leveraging the panel structure of my data, show that individuals do so more often in the presidential out-party. I also demonstrate that House out-partisans (in-partisans) do so less (more) as constituency support for the president increases. Finally, I use data on district-level broadband internet provision (from Trussler 2022) to show that the out-party asymmetry in presidential references is driven by the nationalization of media (Clinton and Enamorado 2014; Darr, Hitt and Dunaway 2018; Hopkins 2018; Trussler 2020, 2022). Second, I support the underlying behavioral argument through a survey experiment. Respondents read an excerpt from a hypothetical floor speech, which randomizes senator party and references to President Biden. Consistent with my hypotheses, when a Republican senator invokes President Biden, Republican respondents increase their approval of the senator and oppose compromise. To-

gether, these findings show that out-partisans asymmetrically invoke the president in floor speeches and, in doing so, polarize constituent opinion.

This research contributes to debates about the separation of powers and blame game politics (Groseclose and McCarty 2001; Kriner and Reeves 2014; Kriner and Schickler 2016; Lee 2009; Levinson and Pildes 2006; Noble 2021) as well as congressional messaging (Ballard et al. 2021; Green 2015; Groeling 2010; Lee 2016; Russell 2018, 2020), highlighting the president's role as a nationalizing cue in congressional rhetoric. Even if parties are mirror images when voting on the president's agenda (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Lee 2009), patterns of rhetorical support and opposition are asymmetric. These results are important for understanding how legislators respond to, and reflect, conditions of nationalization and negative partisanship. This article also has implications for the study of legislator self-presentation (Bernhard and Sulkin 2018; Fenno 1978; Grimmer 2013*b*; Kaslovsky 2022) and nationalization (Hopkins 2018; Schattschneider 1960). While presidential references advantage out-partisans and could draw inattentive voters to politics, they exacerbate conflict and narrow the scope for compromise. I propose that one driver of nationalization lies in elite attention to the president.

Why Out-Partisans Talk About the President

The president (Light 1999) and members of Congress (Mayhew 1974) are motivated by electoral and policy goals. Electoral success depends, to some extent, on policy success (e.g., Arnold 1990) and while Congress makes laws, the president is held accountable for policy and political outcomes (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Erikson, Mackuen and Stimson 2002; Kriner and Reeves 2015; Noble, Reeves and Webster 2022). Americans know little about politics (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1997) and interpret governmental action through salient political leaders (McGraw and Dolan 2007). As a consequence, the public holds exaggerated opinions of the president's power (Clifford et al. N.d.) and Americans use

the president as a heuristic when thinking about politics (Popkin 1991). Affective and ideological perceptions of the president trickle down to his party (Jacobson 2019) and perceptions of lawmakers' support for, or opposition to, the president bear on congressional elections (Gronke, Koch and Wilson 2003). Presidents who successfully pass policy electorally advantage their party (Lebo and O'Geen 2011), incentivizing lawmakers to polarize over the president's agenda (Lee 2009). The president must be careful taking public positions, because "What the president gains by influencing co-partisans to vote on his side he loses as opposition members vote in dissent" (Cohen 2019, 97). Given zero-sum political competition, in-partisans want to help the president succeed and create credit-claiming opportunities for the whole party. Out-partisans must be careful about lending support to the president for fear of signaling tacit support for the current governing arrangement (Sundquist 1988).

More than withhold legislative support, out-partisans attack: launching investigations of the administration (Kriner and Schickler 2016), drawing vetoes (Groseclose and McCarty 2001), and criticizing the president's actions (Christenson and Kriner 2017; Groeling 2010). These messaging tactics, which magnify differences between the parties, are becoming increasingly important in a polarized and competitive congressional environment (Lee 2016). However, the existing literature on congressional communication paints a mixed picture. Theories about who goes on the attack, and when, include: Republican asymmetry, electoral incentives, ideological extremism, majority and minority status, and presidential out-party status (Ash, Morelli and Van Weelden 2017; Ballard et al. 2021; Groeling 2010; Green 2015; Mayhew 2000; Russell 2018, 2020; Wang and Tucker 2020).¹ However, the definition of polarizing rhetoric is broad, focusing on communication that creates in-group/out-group distinctions or references party labels and party leaders generally (but see Green 2015).

¹Although many of these theories are tested using Twitter, Russell and Wen (2021) find that senators' policy expressions on Twitter are correlated with legislative activity. Presumably, these relationships extend to theories of partisan communication on the floor.

However, patterns of partisan communication may differ when considering explicit references to the president. In particular, Green (2015) identifies a pattern in a sample of one-minute speeches where out-partisans more frequently reference the president and presidential candidates—but it is not clear why. I argue that out-partisans do so broadly to take advantage of negative partisanship (Abramowitz and Webster 2016) and nationalize policy debate. Presidential involvement polarizes congressional voting (Cohen 2019; Lee 2009), and by referencing the president, out-partisans can raise awareness of presidential involvement. I argue this tactic helps the out-party more than the in-party. Voters are more supportive of “bipartisan” policy (Westwood 2021) and associating the president with a policy could make it appear partisan, decreasing its support. Further, behavioral research highlights the asymmetric power of out-party polarization relative to in-party persuasion (Goren, Federico and Kittilson 2009). People tend to view in-groups as holding a diverse set of views whereas out-groups are homogeneous. Thus, learning information about one’s own in-group (with which one may agree or disagree) is less informative. By contrast, information about an out-group (for example, the president’s support for a policy or candidate) may lead someone to use that information as a negative voting cue (Arceneaux and Kolodny 2009). These polarizing effects are driven by references to specific leaders more than abstract parties (Nicholson 2012), which leads me to suspect that the literature conceptualizing polarizing rhetoric broadly cannot capture this asymmetric dynamic. Further, the literature on negative partisanship emphasizes the mobilizing power of out-party animus relative to in-party amity since the 1980s (Iyengar and Krupenkin 2018, but see Costa 2020). Even if presidential co-partisans might alter their communication strategies to promote positivity (Ballard et al. 2021; Wang and Tucker 2020), they should be less likely to explicitly reference the president.

Out-Party Asymmetry Hypothesis: A lawmaker will invoke the president more often when in the presidential out-party.

Even if out-partisans asymmetrically reference the president, that is not to say all out-

partisans reference the president equally while all in-partisans avoid the president entirely. Individual lawmakers have incentives to appeal to constituents to shape opinion (e.g., Lenz 2012), respond to existing opinion (e.g., Miller and Stokes 1963), or satisfy demands for a certain type of representational style (Grimmer 2013*b*; Fenno 1978). In particular, Cohen and Rottinghaus (2021) find that lawmakers in both parties respond to constituency approval when choosing to support the president on roll calls. When taking positions, lawmakers can prime constituents to evaluate them in terms of their support for, or opposition to, the president (cf. Rogowski and Stone 2020). For example, Hopkins and Noel (2022) find that lawmakers viewed as more supportive of President Trump were also thought to be more conservative. This logic could extend broadly to in-partisans wanting to signal their proximity to the president or out-partisans wanting to signal opposition. Out-party (in-party) lawmakers representing more homogeneously out-partisan (in-partisan) constituencies should be eager to take advantage of this strategy given the increasing correlation between partisanship, presidential approval, and voting behavior in congressional elections (Donovan et al. 2019; Jacobson 2015). Lawmakers representing heterogeneous or opposite-party constituencies may avoid referencing the president lest they appear “out of step” (Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan 2002; Carson et al. 2010; Grimmer 2013*b*).

Constituency Partisanship Hypothesis: As a constituency becomes more supportive of the president, out-party (in-party) lawmakers, will reference the president less (more).

Finding Presidential References in Floor Speeches

To test my hypotheses, I use evidence from House and Senate floor speeches given between 1973–2016. Members use speeches to take positions on salient policy issues (Mayhew 1974), pursue legislative goals (Maltzman and Sigelman 1996), connect with constituents (Hill and Hurley 2002; Pitkin 1967), and gain visibility (Bernhard and Sulkin

2018; Proksch and Slapin 2012). These decisions are strategically motivated, requiring members to spend scarce resources and put themselves on the record (Hall 1998; Maltzman and Sigelman 1996; Sellers 2009; Witko et al. 2021). These speeches offer a direct and individualized measure of what lawmakers prioritize (Witko et al. 2021). Although congressional leadership solicits participation in messaging themes, “parties are less interested in who delivers their messages than in what members are saying” (Rocca 2007, 500). Individuals’ goals and preferences play a role in whether they participate (Harris 2005), which should alleviate some concern about whether members accede to party pressure when invoking the president.

Although few constituents actively watch C-SPAN, the media cover floor speeches (Maltzman and Sigelman 1996). In general, the media prizes conflict and over-represents criticism of the president (Groeling 2010). Further, lawmakers promote their floor speeches on their websites, in social media, and through press releases. For example, on January 24, 2017—four days after President Trump took office—Senator Shaheen (D-NH) shared a press release linking to a floor speech where she “Calls out President Trump” (Shaheen 2017). Floor speech content is also correlated with what lawmakers discuss in other mediums, like press releases (Grimmer 2013*b*). For these reasons, floor speeches provide an ideal venue to investigate when lawmakers invoke the president.

My speech data come from the Congressional Record, digitized by Gentzkow, Shapiro and Taddy (2018). The time-series includes the text of floor speeches delivered orally by members of the House and Senate, and my time-series spans January 3, 1973 (the start of the 93rd Congress) to September 9, 2016 (the end of the authors’ data).² Per my theory, out-partisans reference the president as a salient cue. As such, I measure direct and explicit references to the president. To construct my dependent variable, I search each speech for the sitting president’s last name (e.g., “Bush,” “Obama”)³ or the bigram “the

²Although members may amend their remarks in the “extension of remarks,” I include only spoken content to focus on lawmakers’ theoretically observed actions.

³These keywords also capture references to presidents’ signature policies (e.g., Bush Tax Cuts, Obamacare), which are of theoretical relevance—lawmakers use them to shape public opinion (Hopkins 2018).

president.”⁴ If a speech includes either term, it is coded as 1, and 0 otherwise. This coding is conservative as lawmakers can reference the president multiple times per speech.

In the analysis, my dependent variable is the number of president-referencing speeches member i gives in Congress t .⁵ Aggregating to the congress-level better captures the quantity of interest—a lawmaker’s overall attention to the president—which varies at lower levels of aggregation conditional on floor time and legislative and electoral calendars. I drop all non-substantive speeches—approximated by removing speeches with 30 words or fewer.⁶ In my empirical models, I use this count as my dependent variable, controlling for the total number of speeches a lawmaker gives in each congress. However, in this section, I describe the data in terms of the percentage of speeches referencing the president. This choice facilitates interpretation as the raw count of such speeches (without accounting for the underlying total) is misleading.

In Figure 1, I plot patterns of presidential references by party and chamber. Time, in terms of two-year congresses, is on the x -axis. On the y -axis, I show the percentage of speeches that reference the president in each congress by party. Democratic percentages are shown in solid lines with “D” points. Republican percentages are shown in dot-dashed lines with “R” points. I also include vertical dashed lines preceding each congress in which a new president takes office. Consistent with the Out-Party Asymmetry Hypothesis, House out-partisans reference the president in a greater share of speeches than presidential co-partisans in every two-year congress. Consistent with temporal in-

⁴I first remove references to the Senate’s presiding officer at the beginning of speeches and references to “the President [of the Senate/Pro Tempore].” The bigram search captures suffixes like “the president’s” and false positives (e.g., “the President of France”). In Table A1, I replicate my results using only references to the president’s last name, which strengthens my results.

⁵New congresses start on January 3, but new presidents begin their terms on January 20. As such, I exclude all speeches given between January 3rd and January 20th in a presidential transition year (i.e., 1977, 1981, 1989, 1993, 2001, 2009). Doing so ensures references to “the president” are to the new/sitting president and sidesteps an empirical issue where congresses appear twice in the data. In the 1973-1974 Congress, I count references to Nixon (until August 8th, 1974) and Ford (beginning August 9th, 1974) separately. When aggregating, I combine these presidencies as both presidential party and congressional control do not change.

⁶Of 100 hand-coded speeches with 30 words or fewer, 92 were non-substantive (e.g., yielding time, thanking previous speakers, asking for unanimous consent). In Figure A1, I plot the distribution of speeches by log word count; the distribution is bimodal. The 30-word cut-point roughly separates these modes.




Figure 1: Out-partisans generally reference the president more often than in-partisans. Time, in two-year congresses, is on the x -axis. The y -axis shows the percentage of speeches given by each party that reference the president. Consistent with the Out-Party Asymmetry Hypothesis, presidential out-partisans always references the president in a greater share of speeches in the House. In the Senate, the pattern becomes more consistent with this hypothesis over time.

creases in nationalization and polarization, the asymmetry is small during the Reagan and H.W. Bush presidencies but grows substantially beginning with Clinton. The pattern is less consistent in the Senate, but differences become more pronounced over time.

Figure 1 helps visualize over-time variation but masks a large degree of individual

heterogeneity. In Table 1, I list the 10 members of 113th (2013-2014) House and Senate who reference President Obama (D) in the greatest percentage of speeches as well as the 10 who do so least often. Consistent with the Out-Party Asymmetry Hypothesis, 19 of the 20 top-referencing lawmakers are Republicans. Many, such as Jim Jordan, Mo Brooks, and Ted Cruz, have national profiles and are conventionally considered strong partisans. The majority of least frequent referencers are Democrats—many of whom have moderate reputations or are not well known.

Measurement and Identification Strategy

Figure 1 and Table 1 provide suggestive support for the Out-Party Asymmetry Hypothesis: that lawmakers will invoke the president more often in the out-party. To test this hypothesis formally, I construct a binary indicator, *Out-Party*, which takes on a value of 1 when a member is a presidential out-partisan in a two-year congress, and 0 otherwise.⁷ To test the Constituency Partisanship Hypothesis, that out-partisans (in-partisans) reference the president less (more) as constituency support for the president increases, I use the president's two-party vote share in a constituency in the previous presidential election. To facilitate interpretation, I construct *Past Pres. Vote Margin* by subtracting 50 from the president's previous vote share in the district (from Jacobson 2015) or state (from Amlani and Algara 2021). The values carry forward into midterm congresses.

The data is a time-series, cross-sectional panel, allowing me to estimate within-lawmaker effects. I regress my dependent variable—the number of president-referencing speeches lawmakers give in each two-year congress—on *Out-Party*, *Past Pres. Vote Margin*, and control variables, including: the *Member's Past Vote Share*, whether a lawmaker is a *Majority Party Member*,⁸ whether a lawmaker holds a *Leadership* position, and *Seniority*—all from

⁷I exclude Independents. Party switchers have one party code each congress as assigned by Volden and Wiseman (N.d.).

⁸Following Volden and Wiseman (N.d.), Democrats are the Senate majority party in the 107th (2001-2002) Congress.

Table 1: Members of the 113th (2013-2014) House and Senate with the highest and lowest percentage of speeches referencing President Obama (D).

Name	House				Senate			
	Party	Number		Percent	Party	Number		Percent
		Pres. References	Total Speeches			Pres. References	Total Speeches	
Joe Wilson	R	100	134	74.6	R	64	98	65.3
Tim Griffin	R	31	44	70.5	R	8	13	61.5
Tom Rice	R	20	29	69.0	R	130	217	59.9
Andy Harris	R	31	50	62.0	R	60	103	58.3
Mo Brooks	R	32	52	61.5	R	116	217	53.5
Jim Jordan	R	6	10	60.0	R	122	238	51.3
Roger Williams	R	31	52	59.6	R	200	408	49.0
Luis Guterrez	D	26	44	59.1	R	206	448	46.0
Jim Bridenstine	R	21	36	58.3	R	18	40	45.0
Louie Gohmert	R	135	232	58.2	R	100	229	43.7
:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Mark Amodei	R	0	16	0.0	D	4	51	7.8
Bruce Braley	D	0	9	0.0	D	22	281	7.8
Vern Buchanan	R	0	6	0.0	D	9	117	7.7
Paul Cook	R	0	6	0.0	R	8	119	6.7
Katherine Clark	D	0	13	0.0	D	2	31	6.5
Curtis Clawson	R	0	7	0.0	D	8	131	6.1
Suzan Delbene	D	0	26	0.0	D	4	76	5.3
Tammy Duckworth	D	0	36	0.0	D	11	211	5.2
Stephen Fincher	R	0	13	0.0	R	1	34	2.9
Michael Grimm	R	0	23	0.0	D	0	11	0.0

Note: I exclude lawmakers who deliver fewer than five total speeches in the 113th Congress.

Volden and Wiseman (N.d.). I also include a congress-level count of each lawmaker's *Total Speeches*, and for senators, whether their seat is *In-Cycle*. Models include lawmaker fixed effects and clustered standard errors. As the House and Senate vary along several dimensions, especially size and speech germaneness requirements, I estimate separate models for each chamber. To test the Out-Party Asymmetry Hypothesis, I estimate unconditional models. To test the Constituency Partisanship Hypothesis, I estimate models interacting *Out-Party* and *Past Pres. Vote Margin*.

Lawmakers Reference the President More in the Out-Party

In Table 2, I present results from four models testing my two hypotheses in the House and Senate. In columns 1 and 3, I find support for the Out-Party Asymmetry Hypothesis. The effect of out-partisanship is positive and statistically significant in both chambers. In the House, the *Out-Party* coefficient is 0.269, a marginal increase of 3.9 president-referencing speeches (versus when that lawmaker is an in-partisan).⁹ In the Senate, the coefficient is 0.124, a marginal increase of 15.9 speeches. To contextualize these effects, a House member references the president in 17.2 speeches per congress on average; that number is 73.8 speeches in the Senate.

In columns 2 and 4, I test the Constituency Partisanship Hypothesis. When the president's previous vote margin is 0, lawmakers reference the president more often in the out-party as shown by the positive and statistically significant coefficients on *Out-Party*. In the House, these effects are moderated by *Past Pres. Vote Margin*. In-partisans (out-partisans) increase (decrease) references to the president as presidential vote share increases. In the Senate, these effects are appropriately signed but not statistically significant. I plot marginal effects in Figure 2. In the top panel, I visualize the marginal effect of out-partisanship on a House member's president-referencing behavior as moderated

⁹In all marginal effects, continuous variables are held at their means. Discrete variables and fixed effects are held at their modes.

Table 2: Lawmakers reference the president more in the out-party and when representing constituencies that increasingly share their partisanship.

	House		Senate	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Out-Party	0.269*** (0.020)	0.317*** (0.024)	0.124*** (0.023)	0.166*** (0.037)
Past Pres. Vote Margin	-0.001 (0.001)	0.005** (0.002)	-0.003+ (0.001)	0.003 (0.004)
Out-Party × Past Pres. Vote Margin		-0.012*** (0.003)		-0.010 (0.006)
Member's Past Vote Share	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Majority Party Member	-0.051* (0.020)	-0.037+ (0.021)	-0.078** (0.025)	-0.075** (0.025)
Leadership Position	0.080+ (0.044)	0.077+ (0.044)	0.156* (0.063)	0.158* (0.063)
Seniority	0.007* (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)	0.004 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)
In-Cycle (Senate)			-0.050** (0.017)	-0.049** (0.017)
Total Speeches	0.005*** (0.000)	0.005*** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)
Num. FEs.	1,838	1,838	359	359
Num. Obs.	9,326	9,326	2,176	2,176
R2 Adj.	0.155	0.155	0.124	0.124
R2 Within Adj.	0.124	0.125	0.088	0.088

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Note: Coefficients are from a negative binomial model with lawmaker fixed effects. The dependent variable is the number of speeches a lawmaker gives referencing the president each two-year congress. Standard errors are clustered on lawmakers.

by the district's past presidential vote margin.¹⁰ The slope of the marginal effect is negative, but the effects are positive and statistically significant. A House member always references the president more often in the out-party, but differences decrease as the president's past vote margin increases.

¹⁰Following Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu (2019), I compute and plot the marginal effects from the full models in the common support region. In Figure A3, I present plots using a flexible binning estimator that is less sensitive to outliers. The results are consistent with Figure 2 and generally support the linearity assumption.




Figure 2: Marginal effect of out-partisanship on the number of president-referencing speeches given by lawmakers in two-year congresses, moderated by constituency past presidential vote share. House members reference the president more in the out-party, but this asymmetry decreases with increasing presidential vote margin. In the Senate, the relationship is directionally similar but marginal decreases at the 25, 50, and 75% quantiles are statistically different from each other only at $p < 0.1$. Following (Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu 2019), marginal effects are plotted where there is common support; more flexible binning estimates are in Figure A3. The House (Senate) figure is generated from the model in Table 2, column 2 (column 4).

In the bottom panel of Figure 2, I present the same plot for the Senate. Again, the slope of the marginal effect is negative, but the overall effect is positive and statistically significant from about -6 to $+9$. Senators reference the president more often when in the out-party until the president's past vote margin reaches about $+9$. However, these marginal decreases are statistically distinguishable from each other at the 25, 50, and 75% quantiles at $p < 0.1$ and should be treated as suggestive.¹¹

These results broadly support the hypotheses. Lawmakers reference the president more often in the out-party, but these effects are moderated by constituency support for the president (at least in the House). Overall, the marginal increases from out-partisanship are substantively meaningful—a 23% and 22% increase of such speeches in the House and Senate respectively. The absolute magnitude of the coefficients are as large, if not larger, than those on majority party membership, a factor that plays a key role in driving out-party behavior vis-à-vis the president (Kriner and Schickler 2016). In Table A1, I present models where the dependent variable is the number of speeches that reference the president by name only. The results are similar, but stronger, than those presented here. Finally, a focus on within-member change could mask a larger collective impact at the level of collective representation (Grimmer 2013a; Weissberg 1978). If constituents see the floor as a venue for presidential politics rather than policy-making, gridlock and negative partisanship should increase. As fewer cross-pressured members return to Congress (Jacobson 2015), lawmakers have incentives to increase, rather than decrease, this behavior.

Nationalization Increases Out-Party Asymmetry in Presidential References

To what extent are these partisan asymmetries driven by nationalization and negative partisanship? Directly testing this relationship is difficult given the tight correlation

¹¹Both the magnitude of the marginal effects and confidence intervals are larger for the Senate. These differences result from (i) the smaller number of senators and (ii) the greater number of speeches given.

between these trends over time (Pierson and Schickler 2020). Additionally, “nationalization” has many definitions. In part, it is psychological, capturing the degree to which voters prioritize national figures and issues over local considerations when casting ballots. Nationalization is also defined as the degree to which state parties adopt national party positions (Hopkins, Schickler and Azizi 2022), voter knowledge of national, relative to state, politics (Hopkins 2018), or how congressional elections follow presidential coat-tails over candidate traits (Carson, Sievert and Williamson 2020). Thinking about these definitions cohesively, some scholars show that political nationalization follows from media nationalization (Clinton and Enamorado 2014; Darr, Hitt and Dunaway 2018; Hopkins 2018; Trussler 2020). In particular, Trussler (2022) shows that lawmakers representing districts with more broadband internet engage in nationalized legislative voting. Following this argument, I use the data from Trussler (2022) to demonstrate that district nationalization of media (in the form of broadband internet access) contributes to asymmetric nationalization in presidential references.

To test this argument, I merge data from Trussler (2022) with my time-series of presidential references in the House between the 107th (2001-2002) and 111th (2009-2010) Congresses. I regress the number of president-referencing speeches lawmakers give in each congress on the interaction between *Out-Party* and the district’s number of *Log Broadband Providers* (as in Trussler 2020), which I mean center, and the constituent terms. I include covariates from Table 2, lawmaker fixed effects, and clustered standard errors. The regressions in Table A2 support the hypothesis. The out-party reference gap increases in district-level broadband internet access. I plot the marginal effects of out-partisanship moderated by broadband provision in Figure 3.¹² I conclude that media nationalization, a driver of other forms of nationalization (e.g., straight ticket voting, party-line voting in Congress) drives this presidential reference gap. These findings support my theory that

¹²Marginal effects are computed from the model in Table A2 Column 2 and plotted in the region where there is common support. In Figure A4, I plot the more flexible binning estimator following Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu (2019). Results are consistent and generally support the linearity assumption.




Figure 3: Marginal effect of out-partisanship on the number of president-referencing speeches given by House members, moderated by district broadband internet access from the 107th (2001-2002) to 111th (2009-2010) Congress. Lawmakers give more speeches referencing the president in the out-party as district media nationalization (i.e., access to broadband internet) increases. Marginal effects are plotted only where there is common support between groups. This figure is generated from the model in Table A2, column 2.

presidential references are symptomatic of nationalizing politics.

In Table A3, I present an alternative test of the nationalization hypothesis focusing on the 1994 Republican Revolution (Gentzkow, Shapiro and Taddy 2019; Theriault and Rohde 2011). Consistent with my argument, the out-party reference asymmetry in the House is greater in the post-1994 period. In Table A4, I consider an alternative explanation: declining presidential approval over time. Yet, I find that even when presidents are popular, lawmakers reference the president more often in the out-party. Increasing national approval does little to moderate these trends. In Figure A7, I use data from congressional e-newsletters (Cormack N.d.) to investigate how these trends evolved during the Trump and early-Biden presidencies. The analysis suggests a unique Trump effect: in-party Republicans referenced the president more often than out-party Democrats.¹³

¹³The first House congress of the Trump presidency looks similar to those of Obama and Biden. How-

Patterns revert back to out-party asymmetry during the first two-years of the Biden administration.

Presidential References Polarize Out-Party Constituents

I have shown that lawmakers reference the president more in the out-party, and these effects are driven by media nationalization and are moderated by constituency partisanship. But how do constituents react? Given evidence about the polarizing power of out-party references, especially out-party leader cues (Nicholson 2012), I expect presidential references to have an asymmetric effect on public opinion. When an out-party senator references the president, I expect out-party constituents to increase support for the senator and oppose political compromise. As affective polarization is driven by out-party animus rather than in-party favoritism (Abramowitz and Webster 2016; Iyengar and Krupenkin 2018), I do *not* expect comparable effects among presidential in-partisans when receiving a presidential cue from an in-party lawmaker.

Experimental Design

To test these hypotheses, I conduct a two-wave survey experiment using a Lucid convenience sample in the summer of 2021.¹⁴ In total, 2,280 respondents participated, and 1,303 passed all pre-treatment attention checks and were included. Respondents were asked to read a short excerpt from a hypothetical Senate floor speech about one of four issues: infrastructure, veterans' benefits, prescription drug pricing, or immigration. Issues varied in salience and polarization, ensuring results are robust to the policy choice. The vignettes were modeled after real Senate floor speeches. Respondents were also randomized into one of four experimental conditions based on the senator's party (presidential

ever, in the second House congress and both Senate congresses, in-partisans reference Trump more often. President Trump emphasized personal allegiance from Republicans which could explain this incongruity.

¹⁴All studies involving human subjects were approved by my university's institutional review board.

in-party, out-party) and whether the senator explicitly referenced the president. As President Biden (D) was in office in 2021, the in-party senator is a Democrat who supports the policy; the out-party Senator is a Republican who opposes it. The *In-Party Reference* condition read:

Suppose a Democratic senator from a state like yours gives the following floor speech about infrastructure:¹⁵ “Today, I rise to voice my support for President Biden’s infrastructure bill. What we choose to invest now is not only for today, but for tomorrow. We need to enact a long-term program to make sure our roads, bridges, railroads and airports are modernized. President Biden’s bill will make us competitive for business—in my state, across the nation, and around the world. For that reason, I support President Biden’s proposal.”

The *In-Party No Reference* condition is identical except that references to President Biden are replaced with references to “this” bill. The *Out-Party Reference* and *Out-Party No Reference* conditions are qualitatively similar, except the Republican senator is opposed:

Suppose a Republican senator from a state like yours gives the following floor speech about infrastructure: “Today, I rise to voice my opposition to President Biden’s infrastructure bill. What we choose to invest now is not only for today, but for tomorrow. We need to enact a long-term program to make sure our roads, bridges, railroads and airports are modernized. President Biden’s bill will not make us competitive for business—in my state, across the nation, and around the world. For that reason, I oppose President Biden’s proposal.”

The *Out-Party No Reference* condition is identical except that references to President Biden are replaced with references to “this” bill. Examples of the other speeches are in Table B1.

Before assignment to treatment, I ask respondents the standard ANES two-part party identification question.¹⁶ I collapse partisans (including leaners) into two groups and true independents into their own group.

¹⁵Wording varied marginally for prescription drug pricing, using “speech in Congress” rather than “floor speech.”

¹⁶Respondents who answered “None of these” (N = 55, 4%) were not asked the party lean question and are dropped. Balance statistics for the remaining sample are in Table B2.

After reading the speech, I ask respondents whether they approve of the senator on a four-point scale, re-scaled between 0.25 and 1. I also ask which is worse—senators who aren't willing to stand up for their principles or senators who aren't willing to compromise.¹⁷ I also asked respondents about perceptions of the senator's ideology, issue prioritization (wave 1), issue importance (wave 2), and satisfaction with democracy (wave 1). Full question wording is in Section B.2.

To test my hypotheses, I regress each dependent variable on an interaction between whether (i) the senator references the president, (ii) the senator is a presidential in-partisan (Democrat), and (iii) a trichotomous indicator for respondent party identification (i.e., Republican, Democrat, Independent), using ordinary least squares. I pool responses and include an indicator for each policy and survey wave. In more stringent models, I add pre-treatment controls: female identification, 4-point education, a college graduate indicator, 4-point age, 24-point income, indicators for respondents who identify as white and black, and binary Biden approval. I refer to models with only policy and wave indicators as "limited" models and those with additional variables as "full."

Experimental Results

In columns 1 and 2 of Table 3, I present results for the approval question with limited and full controls respectively. Those for the principles-versus-compromise question are presented with limited and full controls in columns 3 and 4. To estimate whether presidential references from out-party senators cause out-party participants to increase approval of that senator and prefer principles to compromise, I plot marginal effects in Figure 4.¹⁸ In the left panel, I plot the marginal effect of presidential references on senator approval. Effects among out-partisans (Republicans) are in black and in-partisans (Democrats) in gray. Limited (full) models are in solid (dashed) lines. Consistent with

¹⁷The compromise question wording differed marginally between waves.

¹⁸Effects among Independents are modeled but not plotted.

Table 3: Republicans increase approval of Republican senators and prefer principles to compromise when Republican senators reference President Biden.

	Approval of Senator		Principles over Compromise	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
References President	-0.038 (0.024)	-0.036 (0.026)	-0.009 (0.056)	0.011 (0.058)
In-Party Senator (D)	0.180*** (0.024)	0.187*** (0.025)	-0.002 (0.056)	-0.005 (0.058)
Republican Respondent	0.054* (0.025)	0.103*** (0.030)	0.077 (0.058)	0.083 (0.069)
Ind. Respondent	0.026 (0.040)	0.043 (0.043)	-0.139 (0.092)	-0.134 (0.098)
References President x In-Party Senator (D)	0.037 (0.034)	0.040 (0.036)	0.010 (0.079)	0.034 (0.083)
References President x Republican Respondent	0.139*** (0.037)	0.142*** (0.039)	0.184* (0.085)	0.152+ (0.090)
References President x Ind. Respondent	0.078 (0.057)	0.124* (0.060)	0.200 (0.131)	0.146 (0.137)
In-Party Senator (D) x Republican Respondent	-0.135*** (0.037)	-0.154*** (0.039)	0.047 (0.085)	0.007 (0.090)
In-Party Senator (D) x Ind. Respondent	-0.161** (0.056)	-0.122* (0.060)	0.170 (0.129)	0.141 (0.137)
References President x In-Party Senator (D) x Republican Respondent	-0.228*** (0.053)	-0.220*** (0.056)	-0.245* (0.121)	-0.238+ (0.128)
References President x In-Party Senator (D) x Ind. Respondent	-0.092 (0.080)	-0.160+ (0.085)	-0.163 (0.183)	-0.133 (0.194)
Policy and Wave Indicators	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional Demographic and Political Variables	No	Yes	No	Yes
Num.Obs.	1,247	1,112	1,236	1,101
R2 Adj.	0.130	0.145	0.026	0.046

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Note: Coefficients are from ordinary least squares models. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is whether the respondent approves of the senator (4-point, re-scaled 0.25-1). The dependent variable in models 3 and 4 is whether the respondent prefers senators who stand up for principles versus compromise. All models include indicators for policy (immigration, infrastructure, veterans' benefits, drug pricing) and wave. The additional controls include female, education, college graduate, age, income, race, and Biden approval. Full results are in Table B3.

expectations, in the limited model, when an out-party senator (Republican) references President Biden, out-party respondents (Republicans) increase approval of that senator by 0.10 points. Although the estimate for in-party respondents is not statistically significant, the result is close and properly signed. Consistent with the Constituency Partisanship Hypothesis, out-party senators could be penalized for referencing the president in a constituency composed of many presidential co-partisans. When the in-party senator (Democrat) references the president, out-partisans (Republicans) decrease their approval of that Senator by 0.09 points—but there is no approval increase among in-partisans




Figure 4: When a presidential out-party senator (Republican) references President Biden in a floor speech, out-partisans (Republicans) increase approval of that senator and prefer senators to stand for principles rather than compromise. The coefficients are conditional marginal effects of presidential references as moderated by senator and respondent party with all other variables held at their modes. The limited (full) marginal effects for the approval variable are generated from the model in Table B3, column 1 (column 2). The limited (full) marginal effects for the compromise variable are generated from the model in Table B3, column 3 (column 4).

(Democrats). In the right panel, I present results for the principles-versus-compromise question. When an out-party senator references the president, out-partisans increase their preference for principles by 0.18 points. Results from full models are substantively similar.

Table B4 and Figure B1 present results for additional dependent variables. When the out-party senator (Republican) references President Biden, out-party respondents view

the senator as more conservative at $p < 0.1$. Republican respondents also perceive a Democratic senator who references President Biden as more liberal. There is little evidence that out-party references affect issue prioritization, issue importance, or satisfaction with democracy. The latter is interesting, indicating that Americans do not find this behavior worrying.

The experimental results are consistent with my behavioral theory. Out-partisans can poison policy debate and benefit personally by tying an issue to the president. In-partisans, by contrast, are not rewarded by co-partisans and are punished by out-partisans (cf. Nicholson 2012). Of course, these results focus on President Biden and should be interpreted in the context of modern nationalization and polarization. However, they provide behavioral justification for the observational patterns presented earlier.

Conclusion

The president holds a unique position as the head of the executive branch and de-facto leader of one of the congressional parties. In these roles, the president is a salient and polarizing symbol, which lawmakers strategically leverage to provoke conflict. Analyzing House and Senate floor speeches between 1973-2016, I show lawmakers reference the president more in the out-party. In the House, this effect is partially driven by media nationalization and moderated by constituency partisanship. Using a survey experiment, I find out-partisans increase approval of out-party senators who reference the president, and they are more likely to oppose political compromise. These behavioral results help explain the stark asymmetry in presidential references in the observational data. Together, the findings point toward a reinforcing cycle: nationalization and polarization increase out-party opposition to the president, which may further exacerbate nationalization and polarization.

This research contributes to our understanding of nationalization, blame game poli-

tics and the separation of powers. Whereas past research has focused primarily on institutional mechanisms of interbranch conflict (Groseclose and McCarty 2001; Kriner and Schickler 2016; Lee 2009), I focus on an alternative mechanism of speech. These findings are important given the increasing relevance of congressional communication strategies in an era of competitive majorities (Lee 2016). These findings also contribute to the literature on partisan congressional rhetoric (Ash, Morelli and Van Weelden 2017; Ballard et al. 2021; Gentzkow, Shapiro and Taddy 2019; Groeling 2010; Green 2015; Russell 2018, 2020), but I focus specifically on the president as a source of party conflict. Although this literature has documented a pattern of polarization and negativity in out-party messaging, my research suggests that some of this sentiment may be related to invocations of the president rather than parties or other leaders. Finally, these findings have implications for theories of representational style (Bernhard and Sulkin 2018; Kaslovsky 2022; Grimmer 2013*b*; Fenno 1978; Rogowski and Stone 2020)—how lawmakers use language to shape constituent opinion about their work.

These findings complement Mayhew's (2000, 2017) argument that Congress plays a leading role in opposing the executive and personalizing political conflict. However, these results are at odds with his finding that congressional opposition comes just as often from the president's own co-partisans, spearheaded by majority party power. Are these differences a consequence of historical periods of study, the actions studied, or something else? Future research could get leverage on this question by investigating how rhetorical opposition to the president has evolved alongside historical changes in polarization and nationalization (Carson, Sievert and Williamson 2020; Pierson and Schickler 2020). Further research could also investigate how nationalization in Congress is driven by individual-level change versus member-replacement. This paper also assumes that the sentiment of references follows from party, but sentiment could vary with other factors like presidential approval and electoral vulnerability. Another promising direction for future research would be to map speeches to bills and investigate whether bills that draw

presidential references see more polarized voting patterns, above and beyond patterns from Lee (2009).

Nationalization, polarization, and negative partisanship create conditions where the president serves as a powerful, polarizing, symbol. In response, lawmakers increase attention to the president when in the out-party. This strategy advantages out-partisans, increasing their approval among out-party constituents, and it has potential normative benefits. The presidency can increase political interest (Schattschneider 1960) and serve as a heuristic through which inattentive citizens can understand policy-making (Popkin 1991). However, a focus on the president comes with normative costs: a presidency-focused politics can generate strategic polarization (Lee 2009) and strategic disagreement (Gilmour 1995), hampering compromise. This research suggests that nationalization lies not only in how voters prioritize national versus local issues, but also how congressional elites leverage the symbolic power of the presidency for their own political ends.

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Supplementary Appendix

Presidential Cues and the Nationalization of Congressional Rhetoric,
1973-2016

Benjamin S. Noble*

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A Observational Analysis

A.1 Substantive Speeches

I define a “substantive speech” as one with 31 words or more. To probe this assumption, I hand-code 100 speeches with 30 words or fewer and confirm that 92 were non-substantive (e.g., only yielding time, thanking previous speakers, asking for unanimous consent). To further support this choice, in Figure A1, I plot the distribution of speech word counts on the log scale. In yellow, I plot the distribution for all speeches; in green, the distribution only for speeches referencing the president. The dashed line is the 30 word cut-point—all speeches above this cut point are included in the main analysis. In both the House and Senate, the distribution of speeches is roughly bimodal and the 30 word cutoff separates these modes. Few speeches referencing the president fall below 31 words, implying that many are substantive. Overall, I conclude removing speeches with 30 words or less eliminates non-substantive speeches without a large risk of removing short, substantive speeches.




Figure A1: The distribution of floor speeches by log word count in the House and the Senate. The distribution is bimodal in both chambers with one mode below 30 words (dashed line) and the other mode near 400 words. Speeches that invoke the president (green) are clustered toward the second mode.

A.2 Restrictive Definition of Presidential Reference

In Table 2, the dependent variable in all four models is the number of speeches in which a lawmaker references the sitting president by last name or by using the bigram “the president.” One risk to my conclusions is that this search criteria can capture references (i) to other presidents (e.g., “the president of France”) or (ii) references that are strictly procedural (e.g., “this bill allows the president to waive restrictions”). If one party is more likely to reference other presidents or invoke the president procedurally, my results could be biased. In Table A1, I re-estimate all models in Table 2 with an alternative dependent variable that totals the number of speeches lawmakers give that reference the president by last name, but not “the president.” These results are consistent with those in Table 2, however, the effect sizes are generally larger. In particular, the coefficient on the interaction term in the Senate is now statistically significant. Ultimately, results in Table A1 suggest the approach in the main text may capture some number of non-strategic or erroneous presidential references, and the relationship between out-partisanship and presidential references is less conservative than those in Table 2.

A.3 Robustness of Marginal Effects

In Figures A2 and A3, I conduct marginal effects diagnostic tests as recommended by Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu (2019). In Figure A2, I plot raw data of the relationship between the treatment (out-partisanship), outcome (number of president-referencing speeches), and the moderator (presidential vote margin). The loess (red) and linear (blue) lines generally converge, providing support for the assumption that the marginal effects are linear across the moderator. However, these plots do indicate that common support is narrower than the full range of the data. As such, I only plot marginal effects in Figure 2 of the main text where the two 95% quantile regions (represented by the box and whiskers plots) overlap in each chamber. In the House, this range is [-4.1, 16.5], and in the Senate, [-5.9, 16.8].

To further probe the linearity assumption, in Figure A3, I plot the results of the binning estimator described by Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu (2019). Here, the line is the predicted marginal effect of out-partisanship as moderated by past presidential vote share assuming “linearity” (in the sense of a negative binomial prediction converted to the predictor scale). The red bins depict the estimated marginal effects by re-specifying the moderator as a trichotomous variable with values set to each tercile’s median value. In both chambers, we see that the bin point estimates are weakly monotonically decreasing across the moderator and the confidence intervals of the bins overlap the predicted

Table A1: The relationship between out-partisanship and presidential references is stronger when measuring only references to the president by last name.

	House		Senate	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Out-Party	0.389*** (0.032)	0.480*** (0.038)	0.197*** (0.033)	0.279*** (0.050)
Past Pres. Vote Margin	-0.003** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.003)	-0.009*** (0.002)	0.002 (0.006)
Out-Party \times Past Pres. Vote Margin		-0.024*** (0.005)		-0.020* (0.009)
Member's Past Vote Share	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002+ (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
Majority Party Member	-0.016 (0.031)	0.012 (0.031)	-0.113*** (0.027)	-0.108*** (0.027)
Leadership Position	0.147* (0.074)	0.140+ (0.074)	0.290*** (0.074)	0.292*** (0.072)
Seniority	0.006 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	0.019** (0.007)	0.017* (0.007)
In-Cycle (Senate)			-0.070** (0.023)	-0.067** (0.023)
Total Speeches	0.004*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)
Num. FEs.	1,755	1,755	359	359
Num.Obs.	9,182	9,182	2,176	2,176
R2 Adj.	0.133	0.133	0.118	0.119
R2 Within Adj.	0.102	0.103	0.078	0.079

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Coefficients are from negative binomial models. The dependent variable is the number of speeches that reference the president given by each lawmaker in each two-year congress. Standard errors are clustered at the lawmaker-level.

marginal effects line. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that these models are statistically equivalent from the Wald test ($p = 0.16$ in the House and $p = 0.36$ in the Senate). We can reject the likelihood ratio test at $p = 0.002$ and $p = 0.02$ in the House and Senate respectively). The preponderance of evidence, however, suggests that these marginal effects are fairly linear and decreasing—in line with the Constituency Partisanship Hypothesis.




Figure A2: Raw data plot of the relationship between the treatment (out-partisanship), outcome (number of president-referencing speeches), and moderator (presidential vote margin). The loess (red) and linear (blue) lines generally converge, providing support for the assumption that the marginal effects are linear across the moderator.

A.4 Testing Nationalization: Broadband Access and 1994 Republican Revolution

In Table A2, I present results from models testing the effect of media nationalization (as proxied by broadband internet provision) between the 107th (2001-2002) and 111th (2009-2010) Congress. I use broadband data from Trussler (2022) and regress the number of president-referencing speeches per lawmaker-congress on *Out-Party*, mean-centered *Log Broadband Providers* in the district, their interaction, and controls from Table 2. Model 1 clusters standard errors at the lawmaker level. Model 2 includes lawmaker fixed effects and lawmaker-clustered standard errors. These results indicate that increasing media nationalization in the form of increases in internet access increases asymmetry in how




Figure A3: Tercile binning estimator of the marginal effect of out-party on the number of presidential reference speeches given in a two-year Congress at various levels of past presidential vote margin. These bins generally support the linearity assumption. The House (Senate) marginal effects are generated from the model in Table 2, column 2 (column 4).

often lawmakers reference the president in the out-party versus the in-party. In Figure A4, I present raw data plots and the binning estimator plot for the marginal effect of out-party on the number of presidential reference speeches as moderated by district-level broadband service provision following Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu (2019). The bins follow, and the confidence intervals overlap, the “linear” prediction line. We cannot reject the Wald test ($p = 0.127$), but we can reject the Likelihood Ratio test ($p = 0.001$). The preponderance of evidence points toward a fairly linear, increasing relationship and the marginal effects are statistically distinguishable from one another at the 25%, 50%, and 75% quantiles.

As a second test of the effects of nationalization and polarization on asymmetry in partisan presidential references, I focus on the 1994 Republican Revolution, which political scientists (e.g., Brady et al. 1996; Theriault and Rohde 2011; Sinclair 2006) and economists (e.g., Gentzkow, Shapiro and Taddy 2019) highlight as a factor in modern nationalization and polarization. In Table A3, I present results from models where I regress the number of president-referencing speeches per member-congress in the House on *Out-Party*, an indicator for *Post-Republican Revolution (1995-2016)*, their interaction, and controls from

Table A2: Increases in media nationalization (proxied by broadband internet provision) increases House out-partisan references to the president

	(1)	(2)
Out-Party	0.413*** (0.053)	0.394*** (0.055)
Log Broadband Providers (Centered)	-0.142*** (0.037)	-0.254*** (0.061)
Out-Party × Log Broadband Providers (Centered)	0.215*** (0.056)	0.308*** (0.064)
Past Pres. Vote Margin	0.001 (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)
Member's Past Vote Share	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Majority Party Member	0.037 (0.035)	-0.020 (0.033)
Leadership Position	0.201* (0.093)	0.148+ (0.089)
Seniority	0.012* (0.005)	0.001 (0.020)
Total Speeches	0.009*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.000)
Constant	1.386*** (0.108)	
Lawmaker Fixed Effects	—	634
Num.Obs.	2,094	2,086
R2 Adj.	0.126	0.178
R2 Within Adj.		0.169

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Note: Coefficients are from negative binomial models. The dependent variable is the number of speeches that reference the president given by each lawmaker in each two-year congress. Standard errors are clustered at the lawmaker-level.

Table 2. In column 1, I present results with lawmaker-clustered standard errors. Column 2 is identical with the addition of lawmaker fixed effects. Both models support the hypothesis that the partisan asymmetry grows in the post-1994 period. In column 1, the gap is driven by out-partisans increasing their focus on the president. In column 2, the gap is driven by out-partisans holding steady while in-partisans decrease their focus on the president. I speculate that this difference points toward a particular mechanism: replacement rather than individual change. In column 2, it appears that out-partisans who




Figure A4: Raw data plots and binning estimator plot for the marginal effect of out-party on the number of presidential reference speeches as moderated by district-level broadband service provision following Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu (2019). These plots generally support the linearity assumption. The marginal effects are estimated from the model in Table A2 column 2.

serve in the House before and after Gingrich are unaffected by this change, while in-partisans run scared from the president (see also Brady et al. 1996). However, the results from column 1 suggest that new members enter the House with a more pugnacious and nationalized speaking profile (see also Theriault and Rohde 2011).

A.5 Alternative Explanation: Presidential Approval

If the asymmetry in presidential references is driven by the unpopularity of recent presidents, we should expect out-partisans to reference the president more when the president is unpopular, but not when he is popular. Using presidential approval data from the Roper Center, I calculate the president’s average approval rating in each two-year congress.¹ In Table A4, I present regression results where I regress the number of

¹Following the approach outlined in footnote 5 of the main text, I drop all approval surveys (i) of an outgoing president that exit the field after the beginning of the Congress following the presidential election

Table A3: House out-partisans generally reference the president more often following the 1994 “Republican Revolution.”

	(1)	(2)
Out-Party	0.177*** (0.025)	0.194*** (0.024)
Republican Revolution (1995-2016)	-0.053+ (0.028)	-0.242*** (0.040)
Out-Party × Republican Revolution (1995-2016)	0.156*** (0.033)	0.172*** (0.031)
Past Pres. Vote Margin	-0.003*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Member’s Past Vote Share	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Majority Party Member	-0.059** (0.019)	-0.059** (0.020)
Leadership Position	0.173** (0.055)	0.077+ (0.044)
Seniority	0.008** (0.003)	0.017*** (0.004)
Total Speeches	0.007*** (0.000)	0.005*** (0.000)
Constant	1.671*** (0.063)	
Lawmaker Fixed Effects	—	1,838
Num.Obs.	9,372	9,326
R2 Adj.	0.107	0.156
R2 Within Adj.		0.126

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Note: Coefficients are from negative binomial models. The dependent variable is the number of speeches that reference the president given by each lawmaker in each two-year congress. Standard errors are clustered at the lawmaker-level.

presidential reference speeches each lawmaker gives in a two-year House (column 1) or

and (ii) of an incoming president that enter the field before that president is sworn in. For example, I drop all approval surveys for George W. Bush that exit the field after January 3, 2009, and I drop all approval surveys for Barack Obama that enter the field before January 20, 2009. Surveys of the same president that span two Congresses (e.g., a survey that enters the field on January 1, 2011 (the 111th Congress) and exits the field on January 4, 2011 (the 112th Congress) are assigned to the Congress in which they exit the field. Additionally, I exclude the 93rd (1973-1974) Congress from the analysis to avoid aggregating over approval ratings for Presidents Nixon and Ford.

Table A4: Lawmakers reference the president more often in the out-party even when the president is popular.

	House		Senate	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Out-Party	0.216*** (0.023)	0.283*** (0.021)	0.103*** (0.030)	0.124*** (0.024)
Pres. Approval < 50%	-0.132*** (0.020)		-0.112*** (0.029)	
Pres. Approval Margin		0.008*** (0.001)		0.005*** (0.002)
Out-Party × Pres. Approval < 50%	0.136*** (0.029)		0.038 (0.043)	
Out-Party × Pres. Approval Margin		-0.011*** (0.001)		-0.003 (0.002)
Past Pres. Vote Margin	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.003* (0.001)
Member's Past Vote Share	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Majority Party Member	-0.050* (0.020)	-0.057** (0.021)	-0.071** (0.026)	-0.070** (0.025)
Leadership Position	0.076+ (0.044)	0.072+ (0.043)	0.179** (0.063)	0.175** (0.063)
Seniority	0.009** (0.003)	0.009** (0.003)	0.005 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)
In Cycle (Senate)			-0.053** (0.017)	-0.052** (0.017)
Total Speeches	0.005*** (0.000)	0.005*** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)
Num. FEs.	1,740	1,740	348	348
Num.Obs.	8,900	8,900	2,078	2,078
R2 Adj.	0.155	0.155	0.124	0.123
R2 Within Adj.	0.124	0.125	0.088	0.087

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Note: Coefficients are from negative binomial models. The dependent variable is the number of speeches that reference the president given by each lawmaker in each two-year congress. Standard errors are clustered at the lawmaker-level.

Senate (column 3) on an indicator for whether the president's average congress-level approval rating is below 50%, the *Out-Party* variable, their interaction, and controls from Table 2. This binary variable helps capture the fact that presidential approval can operate in a non-linear fashion (see Canes-Wrone and de Marchi 2002). I include lawmaker-level

fixed effects and clustered standard errors. The coefficient on *Out-Party* represents the asymmetry in presidential references when the president’s approval exceeds 50%. In both models, out-partisans reference the president more often than in-partisans—even when presidential approval is at 50% or above.

Nonetheless, the other terms in the model suggest that approval could be playing a small role in moderating these trends. To investigate this possibility, I plot the marginal effect of out-partisanship for low and high presidential approval in Figure A5. In the left panel, I plot results for the House; in the right, the Senate. Irrespective of high or low presidential approval, lawmakers deliver more president-referencing speeches in the out-party at both high and low presidential approval. Directionally, the asymmetry between the parties falls slightly when presidential approval is low, however, the 95% confidence intervals overlap in both chambers, suggesting that these are weak or null effects. The substantive effect size is also small—a 1.71 speech decrease in the House and a 3.36 speech decrease in the Senate.




Figure A5: Marginal effect of out-partisanship on president-referencing speeches when presidential approval is below, or above, 50%. Lawmakers reference the president more often in the out-party when presidential approval is high or low. The House (Senate) figure is generated from the model in Table A4, column 1 (column 3).

To further investigate these effects, in columns 2 and 4 of Table A4, I model the relationship using continuous presidential approval, centered at 50. The results indicate that lawmakers reference the president more in the out-party when his approval is at 50%.

As presidential approval increases, in-partisans reference the president more whereas the effect for House out-partisans is close to zero; Senators of both parties reference the president more as his popularity increases, contrary to the hypothesized effects. To visualize these effects, in Figure A6, I plot the marginal effects of presidential approval and the binning estimator following Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu (2019). Consistent with the binary results, the prediction line is decreasing. However, the binning estimator plots and the associated Wald and Likelihood ratio tests suggest these effects are non-monotonic. In the House, there appears to be limited responsiveness to declining presidential approval at first, but then the asymmetry decreases by about 0.97 speeches when the president’s approval rating is high. This decrease is substantively small, and the out-party asymmetry holds even when presidents are popular. In the Senate, the results are approximately quadratic—out-party lawmakers seem to talk about the president more often when he is more and less popular, but not when his approval is middling. Overall, it does not appear that national presidential approval plays a significant role in who talks about the president and when. From Figure 2 of the main text, it appears that the effect is driven more by constituency support for the president rather than the president’s overall national approval rating.




Figure A6: Marginal effect of out-partisanship on president-referencing speeches as presidential approval increases using a linear and binning estimator as in Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu (2019). The effects are seemingly non-monotonic. The House (Senate) figure is generated from the model in Table A4, column 2 (column 4).

A.6 E-Mail Newsletter Data: Trump and Biden References

To investigate how lawmakers responded to the Trump presidency, I download data from `dcinbox.com` (Cormack N.d.), which collects newsletters sent by lawmakers to their constituents from 2010 on. Following the procedure outlined in the main text, I search the subject line and body text of each e-newsletter for a reference to the sitting president's last name or the bigram "the president." Any newsletter containing at least one of these search terms is coded as 1, and 0 otherwise. Given that the data begins in the middle of the 111th Congress (2009-2010), I begin my analysis on the first day of the 112th Congress (2011-2012) and end the analysis on the last day of the 117th Congress (2021-2022).

Figure A7 follows that of Figure 1 in the main text, with time in terms of two-year congresses on the x -axis, and the percentage of speeches that reference the president by party on the y -axis. In the top panel, I plot results from the House; in the bottom panel, the Senate. Consistent with findings in the main text, out-party Republicans reference President Obama (D) in a greater share of speeches throughout his presidency. Although the percentage of references is higher here than in floor speeches, the asymmetric pattern holds in both chambers. In President Trump's (R) first congress, out-party Democrats reference him in a greater share of newsletters than in-party Republicans, consistent with the Out-Party Asymmetry Hypothesis. Interestingly, the pattern reverses in Trump's second Congress. In the Senate, in-party Republicans always reference President Trump in a greater share of newsletters than out-party Democrats. Overall, however, the gap between parties decreases during the Trump presidency. During President Biden's (D) first congress, patterns are again consistent with the Out-Party Asymmetry Hypothesis, with out-party Republicans referencing him in a greater share of newsletters than in-party Democrats. Ultimately, these results do not so much indicate a large-scale change in the pattern, but rather, they point toward a unique Trump effect that could be explored in future research. One possibility is that this pattern relates to Trump's emphasis on personal loyalty.

Another potential explanation for these interesting findings could lie in differences between the two sets of data—floor speeches versus e-mail newsletters. As there is overlapping data between the floor speech and email data for the 112th (2011-2012) and 113th (2013-2014) Congresses, I measure within-member-congress correlation in the percentage of presidential references given in both venues. In the House, the overall correlation is 0.34, and in the Senate, 0.58. These correlations suggest that lawmakers are somewhat consistent in referencing the president across mediums. In the House in particular, I suspect the lower correlation stems from more limited floor time and germaneness requirements—two things that are not limiting factors when sending email newsletters.




Figure A7: Percentage of email newsletters among House and Senate parties that reference presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden in each two-year Congress from the 112th (2011-2012) to the 117th (2021-2022). In one House congress and both Senate congresses, in-partisans (Republicans) reference President Trump (R) more often than out-partisans (Democrats). As in the main paper, out-partisans (Republicans) reference President Obama (D) in a greater percentage of speeches, and consistent with the argument of the paper, out-partisans (Republicans) reference President Biden (D) in a greater share of speeches. These patterns suggest a unique effect of the Trump presidency. These percentages are computed from data from the DC Inbox project (Cormack N.d.), which includes the subject line and body text of congressional email newsletters.

B Experiment Analysis

B.1 Experiment Treatment Wording

In Table B1, I provide the in-party reference treatment text for the veterans' benefits, immigration, and drug pricing conditions. Bold text is replaced with "this" in the non-reference conditions. Italics are replaced with negative language (e.g., do not support, does not ensure) in the out-party conditions.

Table B1: In-party Reference vignette wording for additional issues in the experiment.

Treatment	Speech
In-Party Reference, Veterans	Suppose a <i>Democratic</i> senator from a state like yours gives the following floor speech about veterans benefits: "Today, I rise to voice <i>my support for President Biden's</i> bill regarding veterans benefits. Just as we invest in and train our men and women during their military service, we must make the same investments when they return to our communities, hang up their uniforms, and embark on the next phase of their lives. It is our duty to ensure that when veterans return home, they have the education and training and access to jobs they need to fulfill their potential. President Biden's bill <i>ensures</i> that those who put their lives on the line for us will have a lifetime of their own upon returning home. For that reason, I <i>support</i> President Biden's proposal."
In-Party Reference, Immigration	Suppose a <i>Democratic</i> senator from a state like yours gives the following floor speech about immigration: "Today, I rise to voice <i>my support for President Biden's</i> immigration proposal. People from all walks of life—business leaders, religious leaders, our agricultural community, and our civic leaders, regardless of political party—agree our immigration system is broken. Now we have run out of excuses to sit on our hands. President Biden's bill <i>is carefully</i> crafted and balanced. <i>It creates</i> certainty for businesses and current U.S. citizens already here today. For that reason, I <i>support</i> President Biden's immigration proposal."
In-Party Reference, Drug Pricing	Suppose a <i>Democratic</i> senator from a state like yours gives the following speech in Congress about prescription drug prices: "Today, I rise to voice <i>my support for President Biden's</i> legislation regarding the cost of prescription drugs. I continue to hear from people across my state and the nation about the burdensome cost of prescription drugs. There are heartbreaking stories about huge price tags that are stretching families budgets to a breaking point. Our country must do better. President Biden's proposal <i>would lead</i> to lower drug prices. For that reason, I <i>support</i> President Biden's bill."

Note: Differences between referential and non-referential conditions are in bold. Differences between in-party and out-party conditions are italicized.

B.2 Experiment Post-Treatment Question Wording

- **Senator Approval:** Do you approve or disapprove of the way this Senator is handling his job? (Strongly approve – Strongly disapprove, 4pt)
- **Principles vs Compromise (W1, adapted from Monmouth):** What causes more problems—senators who are not willing to stand up for their principles or senators who are not willing to compromise? (Not willing to stand up for their principles, Not willing to compromise)
- **Principles vs Compromise (W2):** Which, in your opinion, is worse? (A senator who is not willing to stand up for their principles, A senator who is not willing to compromise)
- **Senator Ideology:** Thinking about the speech you just read, would you say the senator who gave it is liberal, moderate, or conservative (Very liberal — Very conservative, 7pt)
- **Issue Priority (W1, adapted from Pew):** How much of a priority, if any, do you personally think [improving the country’s roads and bridges, addressing veterans benefits, addressing the issue of immigration] should be this year? (Top priority – Not a priority at all, 4pt)
- **Issue Priority (W2):** How important is this issue to you? (Very important – Not at all important, 4pt)
- **Democracy (W1, adapted from Pew):** How satisfied are you with the way democracy is working in our country? (Very satisfied – Not at all satisfied, 4pt)

B.3 Experiment Balance

I present experimental balance among respondents in Table B2. I regress each of the four senator party/presidential reference conditions on all covariates using a multinomial regression. There is no evidence that treatment groups are unbalanced.

B.4 Experiment Results

Table B3 replicates Table 3 in the main text but provides coefficient estimates for all covariates in the model. Table B4 presents regression results for the four dependent variables not presented in the main text. Coefficients are from ordinary least squares models

Table B2: A multinomial regression demonstrates that treatment groups do not statistically differ across observables.

Senator Party: Reference:	Democratic Yes	Republican No	Republican Yes
Female	-0.081 (0.176)	0.121 (0.175)	-0.092 (0.180)
Education (4)	-0.249 (0.179)	-0.106 (0.177)	0.135 (0.183)
College Grad	0.483 (0.358)	0.273 (0.355)	-0.118 (0.367)
Age (4)	0.031 (0.083)	-0.031 (0.083)	0.010 (0.085)
Income (24)	-0.002 (0.014)	0.013 (0.014)	-0.008 (0.014)
White	0.295 (0.248)	-0.135 (0.234)	0.085 (0.243)
Black	-0.064 (0.363)	0.003 (0.329)	-0.554 (0.384)
Republican Respondent	-0.124 (0.255)	0.060 (0.249)	-0.128 (0.258)
Independent Respondent	-0.149 (0.299)	-0.103 (0.298)	-0.081 (0.301)
Biden Approval (2)	-0.215 (0.244)	-0.063 (0.240)	-0.070 (0.248)
Constant	0.413 (0.467)	0.252 (0.458)	-0.120 (0.477)

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Note: Coefficients are from a multinomial regression. The dependent variable is a categorical indicator for each of the four senator party/presidential reference conditions. The omitted condition is Democratic/No Reference.

where each dependent variable is as described in Section B.2. Recall, not all questions were asked in each wave, and as such, sample sizes vary.

To help interpret the results from Table B4, I present the marginal effect of the presidential reference moderated by senator and respondent party for the four additional dependent variables. Effects among out-party (Republican) respondents are in black lines with “R” points; effects among in-party (Democratic) respondents are in gray lines with “D” points. Consistent with my argument, when an out-party (in-party) senator invokes a Democratic president, out-party respondents perceive that senator to be more (at $p < 0.1$) (less) conservative. There is little evidence that out-party references affect issue prior-

Table B3: Full table of experiment regression results from Table 3.

	Approval of Senator		Principles over Compromise	
References President	-0.038 (0.024)	-0.036 (0.026)	-0.009 (0.056)	0.011 (0.058)
In-Party Senator (D)	0.180*** (0.024)	0.187*** (0.025)	-0.002 (0.056)	-0.005 (0.058)
Republican Respondent	0.054* (0.025)	0.103*** (0.030)	0.077 (0.058)	0.083 (0.069)
Ind. Respondent	0.026 (0.040)	0.043 (0.043)	-0.139 (0.092)	-0.134 (0.098)
References President x In-Party Senator (D)	0.037 (0.034)	0.040 (0.036)	0.010 (0.079)	0.034 (0.083)
References President x Republican Respondent	0.139*** (0.037)	0.142*** (0.039)	0.184* (0.085)	0.152+ (0.090)
References President x Ind. Respondent	0.078 (0.057)	0.124* (0.060)	0.200 (0.131)	0.146 (0.137)
In-Party Senator (D) x Republican Respondent	-0.135*** (0.037)	-0.154*** (0.039)	0.047 (0.085)	0.007 (0.090)
In-Party Senator (D) x Ind. Respondent	-0.161** (0.056)	-0.122* (0.060)	0.170 (0.129)	0.141 (0.137)
References President x In-Party Senator (D) x Republican Respondent	-0.228*** (0.053)	-0.220*** (0.056)	-0.245* (0.121)	-0.238+ (0.128)
References President x In-Party Senator (D) x Ind. Respondent	-0.092 (0.080)	-0.160+ (0.085)	-0.163 (0.183)	-0.133 (0.194)
Veteran's Affairs	0.070** (0.023)	0.079** (0.024)	-0.056 (0.053)	-0.052 (0.055)
Immigration	0.003 (0.023)	0.003 (0.024)	-0.022 (0.053)	-0.017 (0.055)
Drug Pricing	0.070*** (0.016)	0.077*** (0.017)	-0.006 (0.037)	-0.007 (0.039)
Female		0.014 (0.013)		-0.038 (0.030)
Education (4)		0.020 (0.014)		0.052+ (0.031)
College Grad		-0.023 (0.027)		-0.042 (0.062)
Age (4)		-0.007 (0.006)		-0.054*** (0.014)
Income (24)		0.002* (0.001)		0.000 (0.002)
White		0.014 (0.018)		0.006 (0.042)
Black		0.007 (0.027)		0.100 (0.063)
Biden Approval (2)		0.052** (0.019)		-0.090* (0.042)
Wave 2	0.006 (0.020)	0.011 (0.021)	0.088+ (0.045)	0.103* (0.048)
Constant	0.641*** (0.023)	0.521*** (0.042)	0.388*** (0.052)	0.458*** (0.096)
Num.Obs.	1,247	1,112	1,236	1,101
R2 Adj.	0.130	0.145	0.026	0.046

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Note: Coefficients are from ordinary least squares models. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is whether the respondent approves of the senator (4-point, re-scaled 0.25-1). The dependent variable in models 3 and 4 is whether the respondent prefers senators who stand up for principles versus compromise.

Table B4: Empirical results for additional experiment dependent variables

	Senator Ideology	Issue Top Priority (W1)	Issue Personal Importance (W2)	Satisfied with Democracy (W1)
References President	0.265 (0.188)	-0.085 (0.151)	0.069 (0.113)	-0.062 (0.156)
In-Party Senator (D)	-1.223*** (0.187)	0.151 (0.146)	0.120 (0.114)	0.161 (0.152)
Republican Respondent	0.325 (0.224)	-0.078 (0.174)	0.132 (0.139)	0.232 (0.180)
Ind. Respondent	0.543+ (0.319)	-0.232 (0.233)	0.244 (0.209)	-0.091 (0.242)
References President x In-Party Senator (D)	-0.170 (0.268)	-0.139 (0.206)	-0.030 (0.165)	0.117 (0.214)
References President x Republican Respondent	0.163 (0.290)	0.049 (0.221)	0.132 (0.182)	-0.162 (0.229)
References President x Ind. Respondent	-0.995* (0.445)	-0.123 (0.323)	-0.120 (0.288)	0.078 (0.336)
In-Party Senator (D) x Republican Respondent	0.382 (0.289)	-0.169 (0.223)	-0.187 (0.178)	-0.292 (0.232)
In-Party Senator (D) x Ind. Respondent	0.034 (0.442)	-0.283 (0.328)	-0.374 (0.282)	0.030 (0.341)
References President x In-Party Senator (D) x Republican Respondent	-0.895* (0.413)	-0.070 (0.312)	-0.386 (0.259)	0.076 (0.324)
References President x In-Party Senator (D) x Ind. Respondent	0.949 (0.627)	0.236 (0.457)	0.066 (0.403)	0.075 (0.474)
Veteran's Affairs	0.019 (0.178)	0.223* (0.089)		-0.054 (0.092)
Immigration	-0.122 (0.179)	0.042 (0.089)		-0.013 (0.092)
Drug Pricing	-0.225+ (0.126)		0.269*** (0.060)	
Female	-0.033 (0.098)	0.016 (0.076)	0.058 (0.061)	-0.140+ (0.079)
Education (4)	-0.110 (0.100)	-0.009 (0.077)	0.112+ (0.062)	0.283*** (0.080)
College Grad	0.065 (0.200)	0.009 (0.151)	-0.168 (0.127)	-0.593*** (0.156)
Age (4)	0.128** (0.047)	0.060 (0.037)	0.143*** (0.029)	-0.103** (0.038)
Income (24)	0.008 (0.008)	0.014* (0.006)	0.006 (0.005)	0.010 (0.006)
White	0.191 (0.135)	0.094 (0.106)	-0.008 (0.084)	-0.279* (0.110)
Black	-0.068 (0.201)	0.204 (0.153)	0.221+ (0.126)	-0.126 (0.159)
Biden Approval (2)	-0.054 (0.137)	-0.055 (0.108)	0.301*** (0.084)	0.687*** (0.112)
Wave 2	-0.037 (0.154)			
Constant	4.049*** (0.311)	2.931*** (0.234)	2.241*** (0.172)	1.983*** (0.243)
Num.Obs.	1,112	476	636	476
R2 Adj.	0.165	0.037	0.109	0.216

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Note: Coefficients are from ordinary least squares models. The dependent variable is listed in the column.

itization, issue importance, or satisfaction with democracy across groups. The latter is interesting in that it indicates Americans do not believe this nationalized behavior is problematic.




Figure B1: Marginal effect of presidential reference by senator and respondent party for additional dependent variables. All models include both issue and wave controls as well as the additional demographic and political controls. Effects among out-party (Republican) respondents are in black lines with “R” points; effects among in-party (Democratic) respondents are in gray lines with “D” points. Consistent with my argument, when an out-party (in-party) senator invokes a Democratic president, out-party respondents perceive that senator to be more (at $p < 0.1$) (less) conservative. There is little evidence that out-party references affect issue prioritization, issue importance, or satisfaction with democracy across groups. The marginal effects for the ideology/issue priority/issue importance/democracy satisfaction variable are generated from the model in Table B4, column 1/2/3/4.

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